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INTRODUCTION 
“Nations, governments and religions, and all arts and 
knowledges, rest on the basic phenomenon of human existence, 
the city.”1 
                                                     
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center.  B.A., Louisiana 
State University A&M.  2007; J.D./G.D.C.L., Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State 
University. The Author thanks the members of the Idaho Law Review for their gracious 
invitation to participate in the Resilient Cities symposium, as well as his co-panelists, Pro-
fessor Jonathan Rosenbloom (Drake) and Mr. Jeffrey Litwak (Columbia River Gorge Com-
mission), for their helpful comments and insights. The views and conclusions contained here-
in and any errors are the Author’s alone. 
 
 1. 1 MCQUILLIN: THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, ch. 1, pt. I, § 1:4 (3d ed., 
2013). See generally T.R. GLOVER, THE ANCIENT WORLD: A BEGINNING (1937). 
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Few societal institutions have been as integral to the growth and 
prosperity of human civilization as the city.2 It not only serves as an en-
clave for development, education, business, and culture to prosper, but it 
also represents the common goals and shared values that link together 
society.3 Some have said, “when you look at a city, it's like reading the 
hopes, aspirations and pride of everyone who built it.”4 
History has seen the rise and fall of many great cities.5 Great mo-
ments in the story of humanity, as well as the birth and the end of eras, 
have often centered on the beginning or the end of cities.6 Although ag-
riculture has always held a prominent place in the story of human flour-
ishing, the city is where a greater level of development and the rise of 
sophisticated and civilized societies were made possible.7 
Similarly, American cities have also enjoyed a special place at the 
heart of the national spirit and the history of the country.8 Great politi-
cal movements, noted industrial and commercial enterprises, and count-
less innovations leading to a rise in quality of life expectations all 
sprang up in or around America’s cities.9 And while Thomas Jefferson’s 
dreams of an agrarian America have not been completely blotted out, it 
is unquestionable that the country’s development and growth has been 
nurtured and blossomed within the walls of the city.10 
                                                     
 2. See LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS 
TRANSFORMATIONS, AND ITS PROSPECTS 3–4 (1961); Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the 
Theory and Practice of Local Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2010) 
[hereinafter Schragger, Rethinking the Theory]. 
 3. See generally Schragger, Rethinking the Theory, supra note 2, at 312 (discuss-
ing the influence cities have over the well being of their citizens). 
 4. Hugh Newell Jacobsen, Aspirations Quotes, FINESTQUOTES.COM, 
http://www.finestquotes.com/select_quote-category-Aspirations-page-1.htm (last visited May 
21, 2014).  
 5. See RICHARD LAWTON, THE RISE AND FALL OF GREAT CITIES: ASPECTS OF 
URBANIZATION IN THE WESTERN WORLD (1989); Schragger, Rethinking the Theory, supra 
note 2, at 313. 
 6. See Schragger, Rethinking the Theory, supra note 2, at 313. 
 7. See MASON HAMMOND, THE CITY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 33 (1972); Schragger, 
Rethinking the Theory, supra note 2, at 313–14. 
 8. See generally DONALD L. MILLER, CITY OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC OF CHICAGO 
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA (1996); JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICA’S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE (1993); Schragger, 
Rethinking the Theory, supra note 2 (showcasing that cities are an important part of Ameri-
can history). 
 9. See ALAN EHRENHALT, THE GREAT INVERSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
AMERICAN CITY (2013); Schragger, Rethinking the Theory, supra note 2, at 315–17. 
 10. See EHRENHALT, supra note 9; see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE 
STATE OF VIRGINIA 197 (1785), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20110221130550/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-
new2?id=JefVirg.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=pu
blic&part=all (“Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a 
chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine 
virtue. It is the focus in which he keeps alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might escape 
from the face of the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of 
which no age nor nation has furnished an example. It is the mark set on those, who not look-
ing up to heaven, to their own soil and industry, as does the husbandman, for their subsist-
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However, in the past several decades the city has been tested and 
tried by changing political winds, the harsh storms of economic down-
turns, and shifts in sociological decision making.11 General governmen-
tal power and authority has shifted between a model favoring a more 
centralized federal or state government and a structure focused more on 
the autonomy and control of local governments.12 Similarly, the city—
with its often limited financial resources compared to its much larger 
federal or state counterparts—has often been subjected to the ever-
changing economic winds which, when combined with poor local gov-
ernment decision making, can crush a municipality under the weight of 
reduced revenue streams and burdensome financial obligations.13 And 
importantly, the waves of desegregation and psychological shifts that 
favor individualism over collectivity have brought many inhabitants of 
                                                                                                                           
ence, depend for it on the casualties and caprice of customers . . . . The mobs of great cities 
add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human 
body. It is the manners and spirit of a people which preserve a republic in vigor. A degenera-
cy in these is a canker, which soon eats to the heart of its laws and constitution.”). 
 11. See generally, JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 
(1961) (an attack on principles that have shaped modern city planning, designing, and re-
building) [hereinafter THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES]. 
 12. MILDRED J. LOOMIS, DECENTRALISM: WHERE IT CAME FROM–WHERE IS IT 
GOING? 5–25, 105–10 (2004); see also Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543–44 (1954); JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: NO. 47 
(1788), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed47.asp; MIKHAIL FILIPPOV, 
PETER C. ORDESHOOK & OLGA SHVETSOVA, DESIGNING FEDERALISM: A THEORY OF SELF-
SUSTAINABLE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 11 (2004); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 
47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1498 (1994); Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism: Madi-
son’s Negative and the Origins of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 485 (2010); 
Andrew N. Parker, Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development?, in POLICY 
RESEARCH WORKING PAPERS 1475, 18–19 (1999), available at 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-1475; JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND 
SUBURB: THE POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1850-1970 (1979). See 
generally MILLER, supra note 8. 
 13. Howard Chernick, Adam Langley, & Andrew Reschovsky, The Impact of the 
Great Recession and the Housing Crisis on the Financing of America’s Largest Cities, 
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 2011-008, 1–3 (2011), 
available at http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers/reschovsky2011-
008.pdf; see Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual 
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 425–26 (1993); Bankrupt Cit-
ies, Municipalities List and Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-
data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-defaults.html (last visited May 21, 2014) (a 
list of municipal bankruptcies since 2010); see also Christopher B. Leinberger, Business 
Flees to the Urban Fringe, THE NATION, July 6, 1992, available at 
http://www.chrisleinberger.com/docs/By_CL/Business%20Flees%20to%20the%20Urban%20F
ringe.pdf; Jim Christie, Stockton, California Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (June 28, 2012, 
11:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-stockton-bankruptcy-
idUSBRE85S05120120629; Ashley Oakey, A Cautionary Tale for Municipalities Considering 
Chapter 9, 31-MAY AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44, 44 (2012). 
220 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
the city to scatter across the vast suburban landscape away from the 
city’s urban core.14 
In the wake of the Great Recession and the rise of a political cli-
mate that enthusiastically endorses the devolution of governmental 
power from upper, centralized tiers to lower, localized levels, there has 
been a reinvigoration in recent years of the importance of the city.15 
However, in a world of limited resources, uncertain economic growth, 
and an electorate with little appetite for increasing taxes, the city must 
be more resilient than ever in formulating policies that are targeted to 
best serve its citizenry and maintain its place at the center of American 
life, culture, and prosperity.16 
As the economy begins to rebound from the Great Recession, com-
petition between cities has become palpable in recent years.17 Landing a 
lucrative economic development project or the race to capture a large 
business or commercial venture often dictates a city’s agenda.18 Success 
can lead to a larger tax base, job creation and growth, private invest-
ment, and, importantly, increased revenues.19 Cities often compete with 
one another to lure these economic development projects by each offer-
ing their own package of public incentives for the private business or 
developer to consider.20 In fact, in the waning hours of negotiations be-
tween the project investor and the final two or three perspective cities, 
                                                     
 14. See Thomas Bray, Better Term for Sprawl: Decentralization, DET. NEWS, Oct. 
24, 2001, at 8; see also Stephen E. Ambrose, Beware the Fury of an Aroused Democracy, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2001), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/536781/posts; ROBERT 
EZRA PARK, The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban 
Environment, reprinted in ROBERT EZRA PARK, HUMAN COMMUNITIES: THE CITY AND HUMAN 
ECOLOGY 13–52 (Everett Cherrington Hughs et al. eds., 1952); KENNETH T. JACKSON, 
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 3–11 (1985). See gen-
erally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (discussing racial and poverty issues in the urban 
areas).  
 15. See John Parisella, The Rising Importance of Major Cities, AMERICAS 
QUARTERLY (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/1859; Sam Casella, Let 
Cities Be Cities, PLANETIZEN (Nov. 26, 2001, 12:00 AM), http://www.planetizen.com/node/34; 
David Lowenthal, Visible Cities, HARV. DESIGN MAG. 78 (Winter/Spring 2001). 
 16. See Eric Rosenbaum, In Great Recession, Far Better to be a State than a City, 
CNBC (Oct. 3, 2013, 12:22 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101084062; Richard Florida & 
Stephanie Garlock, America’s Biggest City Governments Are Still Struggling to Recover 
From the Recession, ATLANTIC CITIES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-
and-economy/2013/11/americas-biggest-city-governments-are-still-struggling-recover-
recession/7556/; Stephen J. Alexander, Fiscal Challenges Facing U.S. Cities (Chi. Mun. Poli-
cy Grp., Working Paper No. 1, 2012). 
 17. See, e.g., Rebecca Hendrick, Yonghong Wu & Benoy Jacob, Tax Competition 
Among Municipal Governments: Exit Versus Voice, 43 URB. AFF. REV. 221, 221–255 (2007), 
available at http://uar.sagepub.com/content/43/2/221. 
 18. DOUGLAS J. WATSON, THE NEW CIVIL WAR—GOVERNMENT COMPETITION FOR 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3–10 (1995). 
 19.  See Schragger, Rethinking the Theory, supra note 2, at 315. 
 20. Rachel Weber, Why Local Economic Development Incentives Don’t Create Jobs: 
The Role of Corporate Governance, 32 URB. LAW. 97, 97–100 (2000). 
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hundreds of millions of public dollars can be promised in order to obtain 
the final, coveted prize.21 
But the resilient city, only recently rebounding from the harsh eco-
nomic downturn,22 must be prudent when completing and championing 
these private projects that are clothed in the ever-seductive mantle of 
economic development.23 An unbridled desire for growth and obtaining a 
perceived economic development “win” can often cloud local government 
decision making, leading to the support of projects and developments 
that inure to the benefit of the few, at the expense of the many.24 The 
city, armed with public authority, has many powers at its disposal.25 
Various incentive packages achieved through public-private partner-
ships can be bestowed or created in order to attract a particular investor 
or company.26 And while such partnerships and use of public resources 
can be positive and beneficial in theory, it is the decision making that 
goes into these incentive packages that must be most closely considered 
and tempered with wisdom and forethought. The granting of an ad-
vantage to one necessarily creates a disadvantage to another.27  And 
                                                     
 21. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POL. 
ECON. 416, 418 (1956), available at 
http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/teaching/PLSC541_Fall08/tiebout_1956.pdf; Hongbin Cai & 
Daniel Treisman, Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, 
Globalization, and Public Policy, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 817, 817 (2005), available at 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Papers/compoct06.pdf. 
 22. Jonathan House, U.S. Cities Still Reeling from Great Recession, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 23, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/10/23/u-s-cities-still-reeling-from-great-
recession/. 
 23. See GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE 
URBAN INNOVATION (2008); PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 17–38 (1981); Richard C. 
Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 482, 483–88 (2009); Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the 
Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1092–99 (2008). 
 24. See Schragger, Rethinking the Theory, supra note 2, at 331–39; Weber, supra 
note 20, at 101–05.  
 25. See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal 
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990); Barney Cohen, Urban Growth in Developing Coun-
tries: A Review of Current Trends and a Caution Regarding Existing Forecasts, 32 WORLD 
DEV. 23 (2004), available at http://archive-iussp.org/Activities/wgc-urb/cohen.pdf; Gerald E. 
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980). 
 26. See Margaret E. Dewar, Why State and Local Economic Development Programs 
Cause So Little Economic Development, 12 ECON. DEV. Q. 68, 68–69 (1998), available at 
http://edq.sagepub.com/content/12/1/68.full.pdf; Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Decentralization 
and Economic Development, 46 NAT’L TAX J. 237, 237–42 (1993), available at 
http://ntj.tax.org/wwtax%5Cntjrec.nsf/AF19747D3B64B6848525686C00686D27/$FILE/v46n
2237.pdf; Michael J. Wolkoff, Chasing a Dream: The Use of Tax Abatements to Spur Urban 
Economic Development, 22 URB. STUD. 305–315 (1985), available at 
http://usj.sagepub.com/content/22/4/305.full.pdf; Harold Wolman, Local Economic Develop-
ment Policy: What Explains the Divergence Between Policy Analysis and Political Behavior?, 
10 J. URB. AFF. 19, 19–28 (1988). 
 27. See Therese J. McGuire, Book Review, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 457, 458 (1992), availa-
ble at http://ntj.tax.org/wwtax%5Cntjrec.nsf/57C3AA98879532958525686C00686E2E/$FILE 
/v45n4457.pdf.  
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thus, by using public power to give one private group benefits that are 
not enjoyed by others, the field of economic opportunity is necessarily 
skewed to the prejudice of other similarly situated parties.28 
This symposium posits the question: what is a resilient city? This 
Article offers that a truly resilient city is one that places equity and 
fairness at the forefront of its economic decision making.29 Resilient cit-
ies do not blindly give way to the unbridled temptations of economic de-
velopment, which can so easily lead to division and injustice.30 Rather, 
the resilient city is one that seeks, in exercising its public prerogatives, 
to create a level playing field where economic opportunity is afforded 
equally to all persons.31 And in those cases where it is decided that the 
public power should be accorded to the benefit of a particular private 
interest because it significantly serves the greater good, the process 
from which this decision ultimately derives must be considered, sober, 
tempered, and informed.32 In adopting such a policy view, new develop-
ments and physical systems, which are vital to making a city thrive, 
must be rooted in a philosophy that not only engenders a business cli-
mate of opportunity and equality, but also lays an economic foundation 
for the city that will allow it to weather future economic cycles.33 
Part I of this Article explores the history of the city and its role as 
an economic driver, as well as how the economic downturns of the past 
several years have impacted its standing in light of the recent renais-
sance of the city’s place in American society.34 Part II discusses the eco-
nomic development decision making process that is so tightly bound up 
in this new era of intense municipal competition, which permeates the 
post-recession economy.35 This part also questions the wisdom of current 
decision-making processes regarding public incentive packages, specifi-
cally through the public-private partnerships, by considering the ways 
in which these arrangements diminish market competition and econom-
ic equality.36 Finally, this Article concludes by calling for cities, in their 
quest for resilience in the aftermath of the Great Recession, to place 
fairness and equality at the forefront of their economic development pol-
icy-making processes so as to ensure that the field of economic oppor-
tunity is level and open to all.37 
 
 
                                                     
 28. See ROGER WILSON, STATE BUSINESS INCENTIVES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: ARE 
THEY EFFECTS? A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 2–7, 27–28 (1989).  
 29. See infra Part II.C and accompanying discussion.  
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See infra Part I. 
 35. See infra Part II. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See infra Conclusion and accompanying discussion. 
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PART I. THE TALE OF THE CITY—THE HIGHS, THE LOWS, AND 
NEW BEGINNINGS 
The city tells the tale of human civilization.38 The growth and de-
cline of empires, the rise of the great religions, and the birth of modern 
political structures all revolved around the ethos of the city.39 Often 
times as cities rose and fell, so too did great periods of history.40 Ameri-
can society hewed to a similar pattern as the fortunes of cities ebbed and 
flowed over the course of the country’s history.41 
The most recent low point for America’s many great cities came as 
a result of the Great Recession, which struck the U.S. economy in the 
latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first century.42 The havoc 
that this period wrought on U.S. cities cannot be understated, and it is 
only in recent times that these centers of business, culture, and social 
life have begun to rebound and find stable footing again.43 It is against 
the backdrop of the celebrated and often turbulent history of cities that 
opportunities to retool local government decision-making for economic 
development are made possible.44 
A. The History and Tradition of the City 
The idea of the city is historically rooted in notions of collectivism.45 
It is the notion that every individual who comprises the metropolis is 
linked together by a common remembrance of the past, mutual efforts in 
the present, and the desire to achieve a greater good in the future.46 
The first cities can be traced back to the third millennium BCE.47 
These first cities began to develop in Asia along the eastern rivers in 
what is now China, Egypt, India, and in the valleys of the Nile Euphra-
                                                     
 38. See MUMFORD, supra note 2, at 110. See generally HAMMOND, supra note 7; 
JEFFERSON BARNES FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: LEGAL AND RELATED MATERIALS 
(2d ed., 1986); CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & LYNN A. BAKER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (4th ed., 
1999). 
 39. See generally FORDHAM, supra note 38; GILLETTE & BAKER, supra note 38; 
HAMMOND, supra note 7; WILLIAM D. VALENTE & DAVID J. MCCARTHY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed., 1991); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 
32 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2001). 
 40. See generally MUMFORD, supra note 2. 
 41. See generally KUNSTLER, supra note 8.  
 42. See Rosenbaum, supra note 16; see also Florida & Garlock, supra note 16. 
 43. Alexander, supra note 16. 
 44. See generally Jonathan House, U.S. Cities Still Reeling from Great Recession, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2013, 6:17 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/10/23/u-s-cities-
still-reeling-from-great-recession/. 
 45. See MUMFORD, supra note 2, at 56–57. 
 46. See Edward L. Glaeser, Why Humanity Loves, and Needs, Cities, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2010, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/why-humanity-loves-and-needs-
cities/; see also FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH (1898). 
 47. See MUMFORD, supra note 2, at 55. 
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tes, Tigris, and Indus rivers.48 The purpose of these early cities was con-
fined mostly to providing security, public services, and linkage to a 
common tribe or culture.49 
Over time, the vast benefits of the city system became evident as 
these centers began to blossom across the ancient world.50 Describing 
Alexander the Great, it has been noted that his “genius in fighting bat-
tles was not greater than his genius in founding cities, not merely as 
outposts, but as marts through which commerce and culture should be 
spread throughout the world.”51 With the spread of cities—particularly 
under the dominance of the Greeks and their “polis” system—
intellectual thought, art, language, architecture, and trade flourished.52 
The Romans followed many aspects of the Greek polis system in the 
spreading of their empire, and it was often noted that the enduring in-
fluence of the Romans throughout the known world was largely at-
tributable to the strength of their early municipal institutions.53 In fact, 
even after the fall of the Roman Empire, the Germanic tribes that came 
to dominate Europe continued the ideas of the Roman “municipium” in 
the formation of their hamlets, villages, towns, and capitals.54 
However, the cities of the medieval era, the age of the Renaissance, 
and later periods were dominated by what was known in England as the 
borough system, whereby extraordinary authority was given to local 
government officials in the regulation and promotion of trade and com-
merce.55 These officials almost always comprised a “self-perpetuating 
oligarchies of merchants and artisans.”56 In essence, cities came to be 
controlled solely by commercial interests that viewed the city as an in-
strumentality to be used for pecuniary gain.57 And so even in this very 
early period, the idea of private interests coupling with the trappings of 
                                                     
 48. Id. at 55–56. See generally V. GORDON CHILDE, THE URBAN REVOLUTION (1950); 
NUMA DENIS FUSTEL DE COULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY: A STUDY ON THE RELIGION, LAWS, 
AND INSTITUTIONS OF GREECE AND ROME (1874); WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, THE RISE OF THE 
WEST: A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY (1964); MAX WEBER, THE CITY (1958). 
 49. MUMFORD, supra note 2, at 57. 
 50. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, at § 1:3.  
 51. MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, at § 1:3 (quoting J. P. MAHAFFY, GREEK LIFE AND 
THOUGHT: FROM THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER TO THE ROMAN CONQUEST 33 (1896)). 
 52. Id.  
 53. See id.; MUMFORD, supra note 2, at 205.  
 54. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, at § 1:3. See generally LIDIA STORONI 
MAZZOLANI, THE IDEA OF THE CITY IN ROMAN THOUGHT (S. O’Donnell trans., 1970). 
 55. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, at § 1:9. See generally MAITLAND, supra note 46; 
JOSEF REDLICH & FRANCIS WRIGLEY HIRST, THE HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN 
ENGLAND (2d ed. 1970); SUSAN REYNOLDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
MEDIEVAL TOWNS (1977); PERCY HENRY WINFIELD, THE HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE 
OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (1921).  
 56. Maxwell Bloomfield, The Municipal Corporation Revisited, 4 REVIEWS AM. 
HIST. 27, 27 (1976); see also LEOPOLD GENICOT, RURAL COMMUNITIES IN THE MEDIEVAL 
WEST 62–89 (1990); MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, at § 1:9; GÉRARD SIVÉRY, TERROIRS ET 
COMMUNITES RURALES DANS L’EUROPE OCCIDENTALE AU MOYEN AGE (1990). 
 57. Mark A. Kishlansky, Community and Continuity: A Review of Selected Works 
on English Local History, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 139, 142 (1980). 
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public governance for purposes of economic growth was prevalent, if not 
dominant, among local government decision making. 58  The eventual 
movement toward a system of local government that provides public 
services and the maintenance of the common good would only arise later 
as central governments gained ground and were able to curtail the tra-
ditional strongholds of local power.59 
But despite the images of the classical cities of Rome, and even the 
rise of the commercial centers of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, 
the most significant periods of urban growth as we know them today 
occurred in the eighteen and nineteen hundreds.60 This growth was due 
primarily to significant advances in channels of transportation; in-
creased productivity in commerce, trade, and agriculture; and the birth 
of the industrial/factory structure.61 Alongside these advances came po-
litical changes, which heralded greater individual freedoms, more access 
to rights in land, and the consolidation of governmental power and deci-
sion-making within city centers.62 And lastly, the desire of the populace 
to enjoy the higher standards of living and the opportunities for enter-
tainment, amusement, and learning caused people to flock to cities.63 
Traveling across the waters of the Atlantic, America’s first cities 
arose in the middle of the 1600s by way of royal charters and in the form 
of English colonial institutions.64 During what is commonly known as 
the colonial period, roughly twenty-four municipalities were author-
ized—consisting of such places as Albany, New York, Elizabeth, and 
Westchester—although few enjoyed any longstanding duration. 65  Alt-
hough formed to provide an impetus for commercial growth in the New 
World, these early inhabitants feared that their cities would come to be 
dominated by the tradesmen, merchants, and artisans as had occurred 
in England and that monopolies and price-fixing would soon follow.66 
                                                     
 58. See id. at 143–44. 
 59. JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 139, 140 (1960). See generally 
MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, at § 1:9; REYNOLDS, supra note 55, at 102–14. 
 60. See generally ADNA FERRIN WEBER, THE GROWTH OF CITIES IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY: A STUDY IN STATISTICS (1899); JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
LAW pt. I, ch. 1, § 1:4 (West 2013). 
 61. See generally WEBER, supra note 60; MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1:4. See also 
GIDEON SJOBERG, THE PREINDUSTRIAL CITY (1960). 
 62. See generally JOSEF W. KONVITZ, THE URBAN MILLENNIUM: THE CITY-BUILDING 
PROCESS FROM THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES TO THE PRESENT, at xvi (1985) (explaining three 
different periods of city building and the criteria each period was affected by, with the nine-
teenth century being most subordinate to “political and social institutions”); 1 MCQUILLIN: 
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, ch. 1, pt. I, § 1:3 (3d ed. 2011). 
 63. WEBER, supra note 60; MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1:4.  
 64. CHARLES NELSON GLAAB & A. THEODORE BROWN, A HISTORY OF URBAN 
AMERICA (1969); 1 MCQUILLIN: THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, ch. 1, pt. II § 1:10 (3d 
ed. 2011). 
 65. See MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1:4; MCQUILLIN, supra note 64, at § 1:9 (3d 
ed. 2011). 
 66. CARL BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN THE WILDERNESS: THE FIRST CENTURY OF URBAN 
LIFE IN AMERICA 1625–1742, 79 (1955) (explaining that social changes in England were caus-
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Many of these concerns proved valid, as most municipalities rejected 
any expanded responsibilities regarding health, safety, and public wel-
fare, as evidenced by one writer’s characterization of Philadelphia—then 
the largest colonial city—as being dominated by an “inbred oligarchy.”67 
Much like the cities of today, which thirst for economic development op-
portunities at every turn, so too did these early American cities march 
to the beat of commerce and business in guiding their decision-making 
processes.68 
It would not be until the smaller towns of New England arose, 
which were then dominated by religious communities, that the city 
would morph into an institution that was chiefly concerned not just with 
the flourishing of commerce and industry, but also with the provision of 
health, safety, and the welfare of its people.69 These trends continued 
throughout the 1800s as cities came to be viewed as instruments for 
problem solving.70 As such, urban centers began to expand their offer-
ings to include a wide array of amenities and services that had been lit-
tle known prior to this period.71  
 
A simple list of urban functions and the date when they first 
began to be performed illustrates [this] problem-solving ap-
proach[:] . . . provision of a municipal water system (1822); 
sewage and sanitary works (1823); street railways (1832); pub-
lic education (1840); municipal police force (1844); public parks 
(1840's); tax-supported public libraries (1854); bridges financed 
by municipal funds (1863); public health boards (1866); outdoor 
lighting (1880's).72  
 
                                                                                                                           
ing a burden on many communities, and New World colonists feared experiencing a similar 
burden on their new communities through the migration of artisans, tradesmen, and the 
like); see also JON C. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: ORIGINS IN 
MODERN GOVERNMENT (1975); MCQUILLIN, supra note 64, at § 1:10; MARTINEZ, supra note 
60, at § 1:4. 
 67. TEAFORD, supra note 66, at 57; MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1.4; see also 
DAVID GRAYSON ALLEN, IN ENGLISH WAYS: THE MOVEMENT OF SOCIETIES AND THE 
TRANSFERAL OF ENGLISH LOCAL LAW AND CUSTOM TO MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1981); BRIDENBAUGH, supra note 66; GLAAB & BROWN, supra note 
64. 
 68. See DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG 
POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 150–70 (1980). See generally PAGE 
SMITH, AS A CITY UPON A HILL: THE TOWN IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1966); Henry Wade Rog-
ers, Municipal Corporations, in TWO CENTURIES’ GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 203 (1901). 
 69. MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1:4; see also BRUCE C. DANIELS, THE 
CONNECTICUT TOWN: GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT, 1635–1790, 171–80 (1979) (describing the 
way in which Connecticut towns grew and developed); SMITH, supra note 68. 
 70. TEAFORD, supra note 66.  
 71. Id. 
 72. MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1:5; ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, THE RISE OF 
THE CITY: 1878–1898 (1933). 
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By 1910 the U.S. census indicated “for the first time in American history 
the urban population outnumbered the rural.”73 
And, in some way returning to their merchant and commerce-
dominated roots, in the beginning of the 1900s, cities began to incorpo-
rate the first trappings of an economic development and planning appa-
ratus through the use of planning departments, housing codes, zoning, 
and building regulations.74 Cities began to view their role in even broad-
er terms—encompassing not only providing for the general welfare, 
safety, and health of its residents, but also returning to its historical 
role as an architect of economic growth and development, and as a part-
ner in endeavors of private commerce and business.75 It is in this ex-
panded role that cities have often found themselves captive to an unre-
strained hunger for development and growth that, in turn, has frequent-
ly led to an imbalance of opportunity and an atmosphere of favoritism 
that not only clouds the public judgment but, as discussed below, also 
breeds economic injustice.76 
B. Contemporary Decline of the City—The Great Recession 
While cities have enjoyed a prominent place in the story of humans 
flourishing throughout history, these institutions have also faced their 
share of trials and tribulations.77 For instance, just as the nineteenth 
century saw the dramatic growth of the city in terms of its functions and 
ambitions, the mid-twentieth century heralded a wave of challenges and 
tribulations.78 It was around this time older cities that had reached 
their zenith during the American industrial boom began to age and de-
cline.79 
                                                     
 73. MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1:5; see also James E. Herget, The Missing Pow-
er of Local Governments: A Divergence Between Text and Practice in our Early State Consti-
tutions, 62 VA. L. REV. 999 (1976). 
 74. MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1:5. See generally ERNEST STACEY GRIFFITH, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT: THE PROGRESSIVE YEARS AND THEIR AFTERMATH, 
1900–1920 (1938); HAROLD L. PLATT, CITY BUILDING IN THE NEW SOUTH: THE GROWTH OF 
PUBLIC SERVICES IN HOUSTON, TEXAS, 1830–1910 (1983). 
 75. MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1:4–1:5. See generally KENNETH FOX, BETTER 
CITY GOVERNMENT: INNOVATION IN AMERICAN URBAN POLITICS, 1850–1937 (1977); Frug, 
supra note 25; BLAKE MCKELVEY, THE URBANIZATION OF AMERICA: 1860–1915 (1963). 
 76. See generally GLAAB & BROWN, supra note 64; MARTIN V. MELOSI, GARBAGE IN 
THE CITIES: REFUSE, REFORM, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1880–1980 (1981); SCHLESINGER, su-
pra note 72; CLYDE F. SNIDER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN RURAL AMERICA (1957); Joan C. Wil-
liams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City 
Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83 (1986) (explaining how courts define a city’s 
status). 
 77. See KUNSTLER, supra note 8, at 9–15 (describing the development of cities as a 
“process of destruction”). 
 78. See generally id. 
 79. See generally id.; CHARLES C. EUCHNER & STEPHEN J. MCGOVERN, URBAN 
POLICY RECONSIDERED: DIALOGUES ON THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN CITIES 
(2013); MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1:6. 
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As decay crept through the neighborhoods and enclaves of these 
older cities, slums and ghettos began to emerge.80 As residents moved 
away from the city center and further into the suburban areas, aban-
doned and unmaintained buildings gave rise to urban blight.81 Further, 
from ill-kept buildings and structures emerged slums where there had 
once stood thriving communities.82 The decay of these cities across the 
U.S. prompted a federal response that ultimately resulted in the Hous-
ing Act of 1954, and its successors which have since created a partner-
ship approach to combating the problems that plague cities.83 This in-
volves a process whereby the federal government allocates funds which 
are authorized and received by the state, and then passed on to be ad-
ministered directly by local governments.84 True to their traditional role 
as problem solvers, most cities have been proactive—and continue to be 
so—in combating these problems with the help of state and federal 
stakeholders.85 
But aside from these distresses of the past, the most recent bevy of 
difficulties facing the American city have stemmed from the economic 
woes of the Great Recession.86 The substantial hit in municipal tax rev-
enues can hardly be understated.87 Cuts resulting from these revenue 
shortfalls have led to increased privatization and consolidation of gov-
ernment services such as city zoos, parks, 911 call centers, and the use 
                                                     
 80. See PETER HALL, CITIES OF TOMORROW: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF URBAN 
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RACIAL EQUALITY 8 (2013) (describing the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 in re-
sponse to racial inequality); MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1:6. 
 84. See, e.g., LORETTA LEES ET AL., GENTRIFICATION (2008); MARTINEZ, supra note 
60, at § 1:6. 
 85. See, e.g., Dirs. of the Columbia Law Review Ass’n, Inc., The Federal Courts and 
Urban Renewal, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 472 (1969); see also John E. Hayes & Paul D. Godec, 
Taxation Innovations: Enhanced Sales Tax Inventive Programs, 22 URB. LAW. 143 (1990); 
Daniel R. Mandelker, The Comprehensive Planning Requirement in Urban Renewal, 116 U. 
PA. L. REV. 25 (1967); MARTINEZ, supra note 60, at § 1:6; James H. Scheuer, Eli Goldston & 
Wilton S. Sogg, Disposition of Urban Renewal Land–A Fundamental Problem in the Rebuild-
ing of Our Cities, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (1962). 
 86. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE LOCAL SQUEEZE: FALLING REVENUES AND 
GROWING DEMAND FOR SERVICES CHALLENGE CITIES, COUNTIES, AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS 1 
(June 2012) [hereinafter THE LOCAL SQUEEZE], available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/American_Cities/Pew_Ci
ties_Local_Squeeze.pdf. 
 87. See id. 
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of many “one-time” fixes, such as the sale of city assets and the use of 
rainy-day funds.88 For instance, in 2011, lawmakers in Cleveland, Ohio 
cut $35.7 million (7%) from the city’s budget, which resulted in the lay-
ing off of over 300 municipal employees (mostly consisting of firefighters 
and police officers).89 The small town of Saline, Michigan, in order to 
absorb their drop in revenue and diminished state and federal aid, cut 
eighteen schoolteachers.90 And hardly a day went by in either 2012 or 
2013 that headlines were not filled with the latest news regarding the 
Stockton, California, and Detroit, Michigan, municipal bankruptcies.91 
The main source of these municipal woes originated from the ever-
declining local tax revenues that were brought about as a result of the 
2007–2008 financial crisis and accompanying recession.92 Traditionally, 
a decline in local government revenues was counterbalanced by grants 
from state and federal government sources.93 However, the Great Reces-
sion deeply affected state and federal revenues such that neither was 
any longer in a place to serve as a support system to cities and munici-
palities in hard times.94 For instance, by the end of 2009, the majority of 
states were seeing a 13% decline in local tax revenues from prior years 
                                                     
 88. Id. at 13–21 (“From trash pickup and public safety to welfare programs and 
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 89. CITY OF CLEVELAND, STATE IMPOSES BUDGET DEFICIT ON CITY OF CLEVELAND: 
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aid and property taxes, which together account for more than half of local revenues, are 
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 94. See id. at 5–8. 
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while budget shortfalls continued to rise.95 Some states increased taxes 
to account for the loss, but most cut services and grants—particularly 
those which had previously gone to local governments to support every-
thing from “education, libraries, police and fire protection” to “roads and 
transportation, health, and housing.”96 At the same time, federal dollars 
began to wane as well.97 The emerging political climate that favored re-
ducing deficits and cutting spending resulted in less direct aid to local 
governments from Congress and federal departments.98 The 2011 Budg-
et Control Act alone contained numerous cuts to “education programs, 
low-income housing vouchers, community development, and workforce 
development programs.”99 
And even as the economy begins to slowly recoup from the worst 
economic storm since the Great Depression, cities still lag far behind 
states in terms of recovery.100 This is mostly due to the fact that many of 
                                                     
 95. See Lucy Dadayan, Tax Revenues Surpass Previous Peak but Growth Softens 
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matic Reductions in Government Spending -- aka Sequestration, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43961. 
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the sources of revenue that aided local governments in weathering the 
recession—such as draining reserve funds, cutting services, and receiv-
ing emergency monies from state and federal sources—were only tempo-
rary fixes.101 Although cities vary in their dependence upon sales taxes, 
these revenue sources declined early in the economic crisis and have 
continued to remain relatively low.102 Moreover, some traditional reve-
nue sources have only recently begun to dip.103 Specifically, the drop in 
property tax revenues that resulted from the housing crisis of 2007–
2008 only began to be felt as recently as 2010.104 As a result, the desire 
to engage in activities that will lead to increased tax revenues is strong-
er than ever in the minds of local government decision makers.105 
C. The Modern Renaissance of the City—The Resilient City 
Since funds from state and federal partners are so tenuous, and be-
cause the life blood of cities consist of their tax revenue streams, cities 
often find themselves chasing after every economic development project 
that presents itself in hopes that it will result in a boon to the local 
fisc.106 With there being little hope that the spigots of state and federal 
budgets will begin to flow generous again and come to the rescue, Amer-
ica’s cities are having to become innovative and aggressive in finding, 
building, and maintaining new sources of funding.107 The pressure is 
particularly intense due to the many long-term municipal obligations 
coming due and in light of the rise in pension and retirement obliga-
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tions.108 Moreover, as cities were some of the hardest hit victims of the 
national economic downturn, many local government leaders have 
pledged to retool and reorganize municipal governance, finances, and 
functions so as to better fortify themselves in the face of future economic 
battles. 
In the face of a rise in political hostility toward the role of the fed-
eral government, as well as a general aversion to the centralization of 
power, the city has found itself at the center of the national discourse 
and the focus of post-recession recovery efforts. Perhaps this focus is 
rightly placed. Cities possess many inherent characteristics and fea-
tures that make them attractive candidates to become the heroes of the 
American economic recovery. The question becomes, however, what 
must such a resilient and robust city do to serve in this role of hero? And 
how can a city bolster itself so as to ensure that, in the process of seizing 
on growth and opportunity, it does not make itself susceptible to yet an-
other economic storm in the future? 
PART II. THE RESILIENT CITY—NEW GOALS, NEW DIRECTIONS, 
AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 
As drivers of economic development are concerned, cities are par-
ticularly well suited to the task of creating the foundations and infra-
structure from which economic progress is generated.109 As cities strive 
to be resilient in this period of economic recovery, a frank and straight-
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forward understanding of the proper role and scope of the city as the 
architect of economic growth is essential.110  
A. Local Government and Growth Theories in Law and Economics 
The legal and economics literature regarding the role of local gov-
ernment often praises the unique role of the city as an impetus for de-
velopment.111 Economists and local government scholars have advanced 
various theories that support the notion that cities play a special, almost 
distinct, role in the formation and execution of economic development 
policy.112 
1. The Marketplace Theory of Local Government 
The Tieboutian theory advances the view that local governments 
create a marketplace of goods in the form of services, which are then 
used as a tool to compete for citizen residents.113 As certain goods and 
services enjoy a higher demand than others, local governments adjust 
their policy making accordingly so as to improve their offering of those 
services and amenities.114 
Thus, because cities can react to increasing demands and competi-
tion from neighboring municipalities, it naturally follows that they, 
through good management, can be equally effective in competing for 
economic development projects.115 As one scholar noted “cities can do 
well by keeping their fiscal houses in order, keeping taxes relatively low, 
not redistributing monies from rich people to poor people, keeping crime 
down, and by otherwise providing an environment conducive to capital 
attraction and retention.”116 In essence, this view advances the notion 
that cities must be concerned with allowing competition and private 
markets to operate in their natural course, all the while ensuring that 
public power is not unjustly used to skew the field.117 
2. The Legal Authority Theory of Local Government 
Yet another school of thought argues that, although good manage-
ment is clearly essential to the economic development success of local 
governments, it is not enough alone.118 Rather, local governments must 
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be armed with the sufficient legal tools and powers that make true eco-
nomic prosperity possible.119 Some argue that governmental constraints 
often disallow innovation, such as the ability to more freely annex sub-
urban areas and their accompanying economic benefits.120 
Along similar lines, others in this same school of thought argue 
that cities should have more authority in preventing suburbs from 
shirking their responsibility for the economic well being of the city’s ur-
ban core.121 In essence, “the notion here is that certain legal and politi-
cal structures make cities more or less able to affect their own outcomes, 
but that these structures can be reformed, thus placing cities in a posi-
tion to pursue prosperity unconstrained.”122 In essence, this theory calls 
for more legal authority to be accorded to the city so as to allow local 
governments to intervene when economic injustice results from market-
place choices.123 
3. The Process Theory of Local Government 
But perhaps the most compelling of these theories on the economic 
prosperity of local governments—most recently espoused by noted econ-
omist Paul Krugman and others in their the award-winning work on the 
"new economic geography"124—is that which views the city as a pro-
cess.125 As such, this view takes a middle approach in arguing that nei-
ther predestination, through the lens of governmental power, nor agen-
cy, through the lens of management and administration, determines the 
fate of cities.126 
This theory, often centered on the idea that cities are self-
arranging, stands on the premise that “there are forces encouraging 
people and businesses to clump together, and that there are forces en-
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couraging people and businesses to disperse.”127 For instance, a city may 
create certain conditions at the onset of its development that generate 
two business districts, but—should those initial conditions be changed 
ever so slightly—three or four business districts may develop along the 
edges of the city rather than near the center as planned.128 Thus, one 
can greatly predict the development of an area by evaluating the condi-
tions that exist at the initial stages.129 Even the smallest changes can 
have a long-reaching impact on an area.130 As noted urban affairs spe-
cialist Jane Jacobs argues, “making small changes in a neighborhood—
replacing a store with a parking lot, building a road, closing down a local 
grocery—could lead to a neighborhood's rapid failure.”131 On the other 
hand, “the opening of a store, the influx of a few new residents—could 
result in cascades in the other direction.”132 
As cities recover from the economic downturn, a comprehension of 
all these theories of the economic strength of local governments is essen-
tial for good policy making.133 A focus on the way good management, 
which utilizes effective and meaningful legal authority, in turn creates a 
marketplace for growth, as well as the process by which this is accom-
plished, is crucial to ensuring that cities are indeed fortified against fu-
ture economic storms.134 And, in particular, the focus of any such self-
study by the city into its management, exercises of legal authority, and 
decision-making processes should be aimed at how the city incentivizes 
economic growth through the allocation of public resources to private 
developments.135 As Jane Jacobs notes, the smallest change in condi-
tions can greatly impact the way in which an area develops.136 Under-
standing when and how such changes in conditions occur and the re-
sults which step from such changes in conditions lies at the core of good 
economic development decision making by local government leaders.137 
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B. The Profits and Problems of Public-Private Partnerships 
Cities have long engaged in the game of subsidizing private enter-
prise in hopes of receiving public gain.138 For instance, New York, quite 
like most local governments, has long provided special incentives and 
privileges to its financial district in order to encourage its continued 
growth.139 These often do not take the form of direct financial grants—
although they sometimes do.140 Rather they come in the form of various 
infrastructure improvements or tax breaks.141 For instance, in 2004 the 
City of New York allocated $100 million worth of public incentives to 
Goldman Sachs when the company threatened to move its headquarters 
to New Jersey.142 Similarly, after the 2008 crash and in the face of the 
threatened departure of many venture capitalists from the city, the local 
government offered to invest roughly $45 million in seed capital to pri-
vate sector enterprises in order to entice them to remain.143 
Despite being of dubious efficacy, many of the decisions to engage 
in such giveaways are premised on the idea that maintaining large em-
ployers which provide large numbers of jobs are worth the public sector 
investment.144 In essence, this process involves subsidizing existing or 
new businesses in preference to others.145 Often these arrangements are 
dressed up under the auspices of creating a partnership between the 
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public and private sectors—indicating that both sides give something up 
in order to receive something greater in return.146 Political leaders extol 
these public-private partnerships as the municipal financing of the fu-
ture.147 For instance, during a March 2013 trip to Miami, President 
Obama lauded the value and unique opportunities presented by public-
private partnerships when it comes to rebuilding America’s infrastruc-
ture.148 
C. Economic Winners v. Losers—The Uneven Playing Field 
But public-private partnerships suffer from an inherent defect, alt-
hough one that is often dismissed or ignored. In general, the hypnotic 
effect of garnering an economic development “win” often leads local gov-
ernments head-first into the open arms of private parties seeking devel-
opment partnerships.149 The promise of new infrastructure, jobs, and 
ongoing future growth creates a haze around the local government deci-
sion-making process such that many valid considerations are often let 
go by the wayside. 150 One such important consideration is the role of 
fairness and competition. 
On their face, public-private partnerships serve as an attractive 
vehicle for economic development projects.151 By engaging in these en-
deavors, local governments, at least nominally, are able to share both 
the risks and the rewards of a successful project with the private part-
ner.152 However, in truth, the exact nature of the “partnership” is often 
not well defined.153 The extent to which both parties—the public and the 
private—are on the hook for both capital investment and for incurring 
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losses is often left vague and uncertain.154 If costs rise, who bears the 
burden of the additional need for capital?155 And if the project begins to 
decline or if unforeseen circumstances arise, who is to bear the loss?156 
Scholars, policy advocates, and commentators have often warned of 
the many pitfalls that can accompany poorly conceived public-private 
partnerships.157 While clothed in the mantle of a shared endeavor where 
each party walks into the arrangement with eyes wide open, the end 
result of these agreements are often quite different than what was an-
ticipated.158  Specifically, these endeavors represent the use of public 
power and authority to uplift one private party to the exclusion of oth-
ers.159 The private party to the public-private partnership necessarily 
obtains a number of public benefits—be it funds, access to resources, 
ease of permitting, looser governmental regulation, etc.—in exchange for 
entering into the agreement.160 As such, these favored parties enjoy a 
leg-up on their competitors in that particular market such that true 
competition and choice is substantially weakened or even suppressed in 
favor of the government’s chosen party.161 In essence, by clothing the 
private party with the trappings of governmental power, the playing 
field is necessarily rendered uneven such that other businesses and ser-
vice providers cannot fairly compete.162 
And in the face of this unevenness there is very little opportunity 
for the public to engage in meaningful oversight and management of the 
public private partnership relationship.163 The authority to make deci-
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sions for the project is often relegated to a small board or commission 
made up of only a few individuals who hold tremendous power.164 And, 
often one or more of these individuals are surrogates for the private par-
ty itself.165 The self-interested nature of these management arrange-
ments can lead to a disproportionate share of risk being allocated to the 
public partner, rather than being more evenly spread between the 
two.166 
Various policy advocates and commentators point to several in-
stances of unfair market advantages that often arise in public-private 
partnership agreements.167 For instance, Virginia’s Martin Luther King 
Downtown/Midtown Tunnel extension project was bid on by (and even-
tually awarded to) only one single business.168 The fear in these types of 
single-bidder scenarios is that the contract is not being awarded based 
on a competitive and open process, but rather through bilateral negotia-
tions between only the single private entity and the public governing 
body.169 Similarly, Chicago’s parking meter partnership with a private 
company requires that the city pay to the company the value of any lost 
revenues in the event the city closes a street or if a natural disaster oc-
curs.170 In the free market, the private party would assume the risk that 
streets may occasionally close and metered parking will be unnecessary 
at certain times in exchange for the possibility of reaping substantial 
profits from metered parking during the rests of the time.171 However, 
this public-private partnership entails the private entity being guaran-
teed a profit regardless of whatever unforeseen event arises, while sub-
stantial risk is saddled with the public.172 
And further, a major instance of the lack of competition in public-
private partnerships can be seen through the renegotiation process.173 
Often at various stages of the project there will be periods whereby un-
foreseen circumstances will arise that cause the private and the public 
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partners to meet around the negotiating table to hammer out new provi-
sions that address situations that were not initially contemplated.174 For 
instance, perhaps the project ends up needing to be larger than original-
ly thought or perhaps the user-fee arrangement proves inadequate to 
meet the financial needs and must be increased.175 As a study by The 
Brookings Institute points out, even if the initial awarding of the public-
private partnership was conducted in a competitive environment, “rene-
gotiations occur in the absence of competition, [where] the results can be 
very profitable to the private party.”176 During renegotiation, the private 
party holds a superior position at the onset in that it has already been 
engaged in the project for a significant period of time and the cost to the 
public to go out and engage a new private company would often be un-
reasonable.177 Thus, the local government will more easily meet the de-
mands of the private entity because the municipality feels wed to the 
deal and the particular developer.178 
D. Reconsidering Public Financing Incentives—Leveling the Field 
There are many goals and objectives that have been ascribed to the 
city in this era of municipal resilience. As one commentator noted: 
Whether it has to do with climate change and other environmen-
tal concerns, it is obvious that large cities have a greater respon-
sibility because of the density of their populations and their ju-
risdiction over local public transportation. If the issue revolves 
around employment, cities can play a pivotal role in keeping and 
in creating jobs by virtue of the quality of life they offer and 
their receptivity to businesses. When it comes to security and 
crime, city officials are the best guarantee for the needed securi-
ty to enhance community life. And when we search for creativity 
and cultural expression, increasingly we see the inspiration and 
leadership coming from cities and their artistic communities.179 
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However, one function of the city that has been left out is the idea 
that the city ought to fill the role of moderator, referee, and balancer.180 
As discussed above, the city has a long history, both in theory and in 
practice, of serving as the architect, impetus, and partner of and in eco-
nomic development projects.181 Whether it is through direct grants, the 
waiving of tax obligations, or the building of infrastructure, cities enjoy 
a long legacy of being intimately involved in the creation of economic 
growth.182 
But in the age of resiliency, where cities must be concerned with 
how to rebuild and reconfigure themselves so as to best meet the de-
mands of a new and different economy, an unbridled and overly-
enthusiastic agenda of subsidizing private development must be serious-
ly curtailed and reconsidered.183 While seizing upon a potentially lucra-
tive project may seem attractive in the short term, the long-term impact 
of bestowing upon a singled-out private entity the largesse of the public 
purse can have long-term effects.184 And while many of these effects are 
discussed above—including, but not limited to, an undue risk being im-
posed on the city or the one-sided nature of the renegotiation process—
the most important effect in the post-recession era is that it tilts the 
playing field in favor of one private group over another.185 In essence, 
public-private partnerships of this nature send a message to other pri-
vate businesses in the area that the local government selects certain 
chosen winners, and thereby implicitly (although unintentionally) cre-
ates disfavored losers.186 While some groups enjoy infrastructure subsi-
dies and breaks from their tax obligations, others are forced to shoulder 
the burden on their own without public assistance.187 This creates a ma-
laise throughout the municipality as private enterprise refuses to fur-
ther invest within the city’s boundaries—either out of resentment or 
because they believe any such investment should be coupled with a pub-
lic subsidy of their own.188 
And aside from merely the internal strife that such an uneven play-
ing field can create among existing businesses, other private enterprises 
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searching for places to invest may be dissuaded from coming into such a 
market because of the perception that only those businesses “on the in-
side” are given the resources they need to succeed.189 Without the right 
connections, political ties, or a project that meets the flavor de jour, the 
outsider may believe its project will not be able to obtain public-private 
partnership benefits and thus will not prosper.190 And even if it is not 
necessarily the case that the awarding of these public subsidies is total-
ly an insider’s game, the perception that is created by the marketplace 
imbalance can have an equally damaging impact on the city’s ability to 
attract new businesses and maintain existing ones.191 
So although the resilient city should not abdicate its place as an 
economic driver and stimulator of growth, it must don a new and differ-
ent mantle—that of an equalizer, a balancer, and a leveler.192 When al-
locating public resources to private enterprises under the auspices of 
public-private partnerships, local government leaders must understand 
and be ever cognizant of the importance of keeping the playing field bal-
anced. Every new business and private investment that garners the 
possibility of using public resources must be weighed against the impact 
it will have on other competitors in the area, as well as how the market 
imbalance created by any such partnerships will impact the municipali-
ty’s ability to attract new economic development projects to the area. So 
while the resilient city must wear many hats, some new and some great-
ly refashioned, a new such hat is that of providing balance and fairness 
when it comes to the allocation of public resources for economic devel-
opment. To do otherwise is to sacrifice the much larger goal of providing 
meaningful and lasting economic growth for the mere chance to capture 
a project that, although perhaps significant on its face in the short term, 
can be damaging to the city’s long-term development strategy and eco-
nomic viability. 
CONCLUSION 
Although certainly battered and worn by the ages and the ever-
changing history of human society, the city remains at the center of civi-
lization.193 In everything from the development of economies, height-
ened attention to public health, and the proliferation of the arts and cul-
ture, the importance of the city cannot be understated.194 It is, in es-
sence, a mirror to humanity, which reflects both the highs, the lows, and 
the great moments in history.195 
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But the history of the city itself has not always been so fanciful and 
idyllic.196 Rather, changes in social norms, shifting economic pressures, 
and political strife have brought immense challenges to the city.197 Over 
time, traditional sources of revenue and support have dried up, large 
sectors of the population have packed up and moved into the outlying 
suburbs, and crime and violence have infiltrated the urban core of many 
of America’s great cities.198 And most recently, the Great Recession has 
imposed a host of new challenges upon America’s local governments, 
with many of these challenges being here to stay.199 
As cities emerge from the wake of the economic downturn, the 
landscape has been altered and cities are being forced to adapt and re-
tool so as to meet this new world order.200 As this Symposium so aptly 
inquires, how can a city be resilient in today’s world? In that vein, re-
duced tax revenues and financial support from the state and federal 
sources have caused cities to search for new and innovative ways to pro-
duce funds to support local government functions.201 One such avenue 
involves the creation of new and inventive public-private partnerships, 
whereby local governments and private parties pool resources and share 
in risks so as to achieve a goal or complete a project that the municipali-
ty alone would not have been able to accomplish.202 However, in doing 
so, the city necessarily endows this favored private party with many of 
the benefits of public power.203 And through these public benefits the 
atmosphere of competition and equity in the marketplace is slanted.204 A 
city can only be resilient if it can both sustain and further grow its econ-
omy. 205  But such favoritism in public-private partnerships can have 
wide-ranging adverse effects, not only for local enterprises, but also for 
new businesses that seek to locate or invest in the area.206 Thus, while 
cities must be ever vigilant in seizing upon economic development op-
portunities to couple private investment with public resources in order 
to achieve a significant and positive overall result, the city must be 
equally committed to ensuring that it behaves in such a way so as to 
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encourage competition and fairness for all those who wish to invest or do 
business within its borders.207 
So while the resilient city must wear many hats and step into roles 
that have previously been foreign to generally accepted notions of local 
governance, one that cannot be overlooked is the city’s role in keeping 
the marketplace level so that private parties have confidence that eve-
ryone plays by the same rules and has the same opportunities to thrive 
and prosper.208 By creating a business environment where parties feel 
assured that their achievements (and failures) occur by the work of their 
own hands, rather than through municipal largesse, cities can truly be-
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